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14. ABSTRACT The U.S. Army Constabulary proved to be an effective stabilizing force in post-war Germany. High quality training and selective personnel assignment ensured the effectiveness of the unit. By applying the lessons learned from the Constabulary, especially regarding training, US-PRTs in Afghanistan can greatly improve their impact as tools of U.S. national policy.					
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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:

**UNITED STATES CONSTABULARY IN POST-WORLD WAR TWO GERMANY:
WHAT CAN COWBOYS TELL US ABOUT STABILITY OPERATIONS TODAY?**

**SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
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Executive Summary

Title: United States Constabulary in Post-World War Two Germany: What Can Cowboys Tell Us About Stability Operations Today?

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Thesis: Through specialized constabulary-style training, US-PRTs can increase their effectiveness as an instrument of U.S. policy

Discussion: In the debate surrounding the best method for conducting Stability Operations, some argue that to properly carry out the essential tasks necessary, a constabulary force needs to be created. Others would argue that the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) construct is a proven method for conducting Stability Operations and need not be replaced. This paper does not seek to settle the debate; rather, it looks to the past in search of ways to improve the current PRT construct. A history of the U.S. Constabulary, colloquially known at the Circle C Cowboys for their distinct unit insignia, provides lessons regarding the importance of specialized training for Stability Operations. The constabulary, formed from former combat arms units, very rapidly became a stabilizing force in Germany. Though the unit faced very high turnover rates and was often manned with inexperienced conscripts, the training provided forged the unit to an elite force. A strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats analysis of US-PRTs in Afghanistan demonstrates that specialized constabulary-type policing skills are missing and represent the greatest weakness of US-PRTs. Prospects for increased security beyond the immediate area of influence of the PRTs coupled with opportunities for increased dialogue with indigenous personnel, intelligence gathering, and strengthened ties with the Afghan National Police all justify the relatively low cost for training. Therefore, recommendations regarding training tasks and manning selections are briefly provided, with ample opportunity provided for future research.

Conclusion: US-PRTs will greatly benefit if they apply training similar to that provided by the U.S. Constabulary.

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Preface

In 1997, as a Specialist with the Ohio Army National Guard, I deployed to Bosnia in support of NATO's SFOR Peacekeeping mission. I was fortunate to have a job that allowed me to travel throughout the country. The one thing that struck me was how we were received as we travelled from town to town. I had romantic notions of being greeted warmly as a harbinger of peace and as a symbol of the prosperity I was sure would follow. To my surprise, we were often glared at and looked at with suspicion. It was not long before I realized that in comparison to constabulary forces such as the Italian Carabinieri or French Gendarmerie Nationale, we looked like invaders. We kept to ourselves as ordered, did not build relationships or mingle with the people, and we travelled in full "battle rattle." I had no idea what type of force the Carabinieri or Gendarmerie were, but I saw for myself that they were treated well by the local populous, and it did not take full "battle rattle" to keep them safe. With that experience in mind, I sought to discover more.

To say that I was ill informed prior to beginning this work is an understatement. I had never heard the term constabulary before, so it is with a grateful heart that I thank Dr. Rebecca Johnson for pointing me in the right direction and Dr. Tammy Schultz for her patience. With that, I believe that the following pages provide instructive lessons regarding the importance of quality, specialized constabulary-type training in a Stability Operations missions. The Circle C Cowboys were a proud and effective unit due mostly to their training. Whether US-PRTs represent a viable alternative to a constabulary may be debatable; however, it is not contentious that a small investment in training will yield dividends far beyond the investment. It is with the hope that future soldiers can work with, rather than against, indigenous personnel that I present this paper for consideration and examination.

Today, the United States is embroiled in a long and difficult campaign against a determined foe. The great effort is unlike the conventional wars for which the United States military has organized, trained, and equipped itself for most of the past century. Although a majority of military operations from 1991 to 2001 were centered on Stability Operations, it was not until the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan that doctrine, training, and equipment altered in recognition of the importance of Stability Operations. The changes required nearly a decade of re-organizing, training, and equipping the U.S. military for the current fight. In the time it took to accomplish those tasks momentum was lost, the timeline for the conclusion of operations was extended and ultimately, more lives were lost.

Though many attitudes have changed and it is unlikely there will ever be a cold war type Army again in the near future, there is continuing debate regarding whether the growing pains suffered should lead to permanent change or whether those changes have not gone far enough. On one side of the debate fall proponents of getting “back to basics” or “back to our roots.” Former Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, General James Conway, called for a return to maritime operations and warfighting from the sea in lieu of becoming a second land Army, engaged in prolonged campaigns such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, requiring the force to conduct seemingly endless Stability Operations.¹ On the other side of the debate are scholars such as Robert Perito, who through his book, *Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search for a Postconflict Stability Force* makes the case for creating a meaningful postconflict capacity; specifically, he recognizes that Stability Operations are a mission set likely to continue well into the future. He therefore advocates constabularies as one part of the solution to the lack of a purpose-trained postconflict stability force.²

Rather than advocating for or against re-forming a constabulary in the U.S. military, this paper assumes that in the near future, the status quo will remain; therefore, whatever capacity we have today is what we are likely to employ for the next several years. To that end, the purpose of this paper is simply to look to past constabulary operations with the aim of answering the question: can a study of U.S. Constabulary operations in post-World War Two Germany provide useful and timely lessons applicable to improving how we conduct Stability Operations in Afghanistan?

With that question in mind, the foundation for discussion is laid by describing the purpose of constabulary forces, providing an example of the quintessential modern constabulary force, and then debating why the U.S. military does not have one. Next, a spotlight on the history of the U.S. Constabulary unit colloquially referred to as the Circle C Cowboys, demonstrates how specialized training can be effective in preparing soldiers to properly conduct critical Stability Operations tasks. Next, a concise background on how Stability Operations in Afghanistan are conducted today via U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (US-PRTs) sets the stage for a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) analysis of US-PRT operations. Finally, given the history of the Circle C Cowboys, their focus on training, and their level of success, the principal lesson we can apply to US-PRTs today is that through specialized constabulary-style training, US-PRTs can increase their effectiveness as an instrument of U.S. policy. However, because it is outside the scope of this paper, further research should be conducted to add detail to the training plan recommended. First, in order to understand how the military got to where it is today, it is critical to comprehend what the missions of constabularies are and why the U.S. military does not have one.

Constabulary forces are often equated with and described as a paramilitary force. That is, they are an armed force which has distinctly military attributes, but provides different skills. In some instances, constabularies are part of a nation's military force whereas in other nations the constabulary falls within the Department of Interior or other similar department. As will be addressed later, this can be a significant distinction, especially for the United States. However, whether the force falls within the military is not the key defining attribute; rather, it is the unique organization, training, and equipment with which constabularies operate that sets them apart. Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, constabulary forces are defined as government forces that provide force protection and law enforcement through the coordination of lethal firepower and the utilization of police skills. In other words, though constabulary forces share attributes with conventional military forces, they offer a different set of skills. It is the combination of policing and firepower that makes constabularies unique.

Further differentiating constabularies from conventional military forces is how their resident firepower is employed. Whereas conventional military forces often use the most force allowed by rules of engagement to accomplish their mission, constabularies employ the least force necessary to accomplish theirs.³ This subtle difference is significant in that it demonstrates the difference in mindset between conventional military forces and constabulary forces. A modern example will help further illustrate what skills constabulary forces bring.

One modern example of a constabulary force is the French Gendarmerie. The French Gendarmerie is the prototypical constabulary and its very name has been used as a common term for many constabulary forces. Its missions include:

The policing of the countryside, rivers, coastal areas, and small towns with populations under 20,000, that are outside of the jurisdiction of the French National Police; criminal investigations under judiciary supervision; crowd control and other security activities; the security of airports and military

installations, as well as all investigations relating to the military, including foreign interventions; participation in ceremonies involving foreign heads of state or heads of government; and provision of military police services to the French military.⁴

In addition to these missions, the Gendarmerie is a member of the European Union Gendarmerie Force (EGF) and has been employed in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia as part of its responsibility as a member of that organization. Part of its mission was to train the host nation police force in order to turn control back to indigenous forces as soon as practical.⁵ The Gendarmerie is typical in that it is a domestic force that may be employed outside of its national borders, but limited resources often prevent numerous or lengthy foreign employments.⁶ In order to recognize how the missions assigned to the Gendarmerie are accomplished, and to set the foundation for future discussion, it is important to understand how the organization is organized, trained and equipped.

Although a member of the French Armed Forces, the Gendarmerie is operationally attached to the Ministry of the Interior. This is similar with the United States Coast Guard who is a member of the U.S. military, but does not fall under the Department of Defense. The Gendarmerie, a force of 105,975, consists of several branches including the Departmental Gendarmerie, the Mobile Gendarmerie and a host of smaller, specialized units such as marine, aviation, and ceremonial units.⁷ The largest of the branches is the Departmental Gendarmerie.

The Departmental Gendarmerie is the territorial police branch, in regular contact with the population and local police. Organized around the local administration, the basic unit consists of 5 to 40 person brigades.⁸ The officers work with local law enforcement and coordinate with higher levels of the Gendarmerie, when necessary, to coordinate between localities, provinces, and other entities. Whereas the Departmental Gendarmerie centers on policing, the second

largest branch, the Mobile Gendarmerie, focuses more on force protection and civil disobedience.

The Mobile Gendarmerie is a small force of about 17,350 personnel.⁹ The Mobile Gendarmerie missions include: riot control and ensuring the return to order; monitoring the territory to which it is assigned and that territory's dependencies; guarding significant points such as embassies; defending the territory to which it is assigned; acting as a reserve for the Departmental Gendarmerie; and finally, conducting external operations.¹⁰ As a consequence of this mission set, the Mobile Gendarmerie is more heavily armed than its Departmental counterpart, and is more traditionally military in appearance and training; however, as discussed earlier, as a constabulary force it remains committed to internal defense, peacekeeping, and stability operations rather than combat operations. Combined, all of the branches of the French Gendarmerie present a skill set vital to the peace and well-being of France and lift a burden which would otherwise fall to local police, national police and the conventional French military. Given the advantages a constabulary force brings, one must briefly consider why the U.S. military, or Department of Defense, does not have a constabulary of its own.

The most obvious prohibition against a domestic military constabulary in the United States is the Posse Comitatus Act. The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act was passed with the intent of removing the Army from domestic law enforcement.¹¹ Posse Comitatus means "the power of the county," reflecting the inherent power of the old West county sheriff to call upon a posse of able-bodied men to supplement law enforcement assets and thereby maintain the peace.¹² Following the Civil War, the Army had been employed throughout the South to maintain civil order, to enforce the policies of the Reconstruction era, and to ensure that any lingering sentiments of rebellion were crushed. However, in reaching those goals, the Army necessarily became

involved in traditional police roles and in enforcing politically volatile Reconstruction-era policies.¹³ The stationing of federal troops at political events and polling places under the justification of maintaining domestic order became of increasing concern to Congress, which felt that the Army was becoming politicized and straying from its original national defense mission. Therefore, “the Posse Comitatus Act was thus passed to remove the Army from civilian law enforcement and to return it to its role of defending the borders of the United States.”¹⁴ Though the prohibition from using military forces for policing within the borders of the United State helps explain why there is no standing domestic constabulary within the Department of Defense, it does not explain why the military does not employ a constabulary force overseas. Recognizing a gap in the military’s capability to address police-type actions, forming a constabulary was considered just a decade ago.

Before the attacks of September 11, 2001 the need to form a constabulary was recognized by Congress. The release of the Hart-Rudman report in January 2001, a bipartisan study whose focus was on homeland defense, called for the Secretary of Defense to address the need for constabulary forces. Specifically, it stated:

Humanitarian relief and constabulary operations will involve all the military services, including the support that has been customarily provided by naval, air, and ground forces. Other government and non-government organizations will undoubtedly be involved, and this should be anticipated in preparing for such missions. The constabulary capabilities should be vested primarily in Army and Marine Corps elements trained and equipped with weapons and mobility resources that will enhance the conduct of such missions, which should be additive to other force structure requirements.¹⁵

However, with the attacks in September, the focus returned to conventional warfighting, first in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. The need to address stability and reconstruction revealed itself slowly. Recognizing the need to operate within a whole of government approach to meet the

emerging Stability Operations mission, recommendations began to percolate up the chain of command. The result was a new type of organization: Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

US-PRTs are civil-military organizations designed to meet a wide range of needs, some of which directly overlap with those of constabulary forces. These missions include “extending the reach of the national government, enhancing security, and helping to facilitate reconstruction.”¹⁶ The strengths and weaknesses of civil-military US-PRTs are addressed later in this work. For now, it is sufficient to note that US-PRTs are the U.S. Government’s construct of choice for addressing Stability Operations. Although US-PRTs were formed by means of existing capabilities, they are a new construct; therefore, we must look to the past for examples of post-conflict Stability Operations in order to glean lessons that can enhance the effectiveness of US-PRTs. With that in mind, examination of how the U.S. Army addressed Stability Operations using a constabulary force in post-World War II Germany is warranted.

Allied commanders recognized early in the war that planning for post war Europe should begin in earnest. Planning began at the Casablanca Conference in 1943, two full years prior to the termination of hostilities. Starting with Operation RANKIN and later with Operation ECLIPSE, details such as the zones of occupation, which power would be assigned to each zone, and the numbers of divisions to be assigned occupation duties in the respective zones was decided.¹⁷ However, it was not until the Tehran Conference in 1945 that a strategic planning agency, the Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander, was formed. Even then, detailed planning for post-war Germany did not occur until the end of hostilities in May 1945.¹⁸ Therefore, the only actionable guidance to American forces came in the form of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Directive 1067 which established a military government in the American Zone of Occupation.¹⁹

JCS Directive 1067 directed that tactical units occupying a local area assume the role of the military government. It also directed the denazification of the American Zone of Occupation and forbade fraternization with the German people. The goal of the directive was U.S. military governance until local, non-Nazi personnel could govern themselves. At the end of the war and as the occupation began, insurrection from hard-line Nazis was the principal concern; however, it became evident that there were other threats to the peace as well. A tremendous threat to stability in Germany resided in criminal black market activities. This was exacerbated by the porous borders between the zones. Specifically, the movement of thousands of Displaced Personnel (DP) from the Soviet Zone to the West created a shortfall in already limited resources and added to the 110,000 DPs in the Zone at the end of the war.²⁰ Further at issue was the fact that the only personnel with goods and money were battle-hardened American G.I.s who were all too ready to ignore the fraternization regulations to turn a profit.

By October it was clear that to fend off insurrection, combat illegal trade, secure the borders, and act as a link between military government and indigenous government, a new type of unit was needed. Thus, in October of 1945, General Eisenhower announced the formation of a special constabulary of 38,000 men, slated for formal activation on 1 July 1946.²¹ Its mission, as codified in what would become known as the Trooper's Handbook, read: "The Zone Constabulary will maintain general security within the United States Zone of Occupation in Germany (Austria)."²² That zone would encompass nearly 40,000 square miles (roughly the size of Pennsylvania) and more than 16 million Germans.²³

To lead the creation of this new organization, Major General (MG) Ernest E. Harmon took command on 10 January 1946. With only six months to plan the unit's organization and training and procure necessary equipment, the task seemed nearly impossible. Fortunately, MG

Harmon was up to the task. Previous experience as commander of the First and Second Armor Divisions in combat and as the VI Corps Commander after the war meant that Harmon understood the complexities of command. He began by organizing his forces such that an emphasis on flexibility was paramount.

Rather than maintaining a division-style approach common to the U.S. Army at that time, MG Harmon followed the cavalry-style organization of Brigades and Regiments (Appendix A). Though authorized 38,000 men, the total forces available to the Constabulary consisted of 32,000 men organized into three brigades, nine regiments, 27 squadrons, and 144 troops as well as headquarters and service units.²⁴ Each of the three brigades consisted of three regiments, and each regiment included three squadrons and one light tank company. Each squadron was comprised of five troops.²⁵ The units themselves were mostly drawn from cavalry and armor units. MG Harmon employed this strategy because the constabulary would be highly mobile, relatively lightly armed, and performing distributed operations.

Distributed operations for constabulary troopers meant that they would often be working in remote areas with nothing more than one other trooper and a radio for support. The constabulary troopers' mission, whether on border patrol or conducting police activity, required that troopers be responsible for large geographic areas. This meant that the troopers would frequently be the only representatives of the United States government with which local personnel would have contact. Combined with the need to respond quickly and decisively, troopers faced a daunting mission.

The complex mission in a distributed operations environment meant that troopers and their commanders would have to be chosen wisely. MG Harmon was quoted by the New York Sun as saying, "This new constabulary demands the utmost versatility of its commander. It's to

be a composite force of all arms from airplanes to tanks and riflemen, with some troopers—that's what they call the G.I.s now in the outfit—on horseback, some on motorcycles, some in automobiles of various types, including radio cars, and, eventually, some on skis. But, given the right commander, with the requisite understanding of all arms and their respective uses, the force promises to be the ideal instrument for occupational duties."²⁶ Executing such a complex mission would require selecting the best possible personnel and providing them with top notch training.

From the onset, MG Harmon sought to make the U.S. Constabulary an elite unit. This was necessary to combat the plethora of problems which beset the U.S. Army. Rapid demobilization following the American public's cry to bring the soldiers home left the Army in shambles. Furthermore, the general perception was that "American soldiers are men who drink to excess; have no respect for the uniform they wear; are prone to rowdiness and to beat civilians with no regards to human rights; and to benefit themselves through the black market."²⁷ Exacerbating the problem was the fact that the numbers of personnel from which the Constabulary was to draw its forces were being drastically reduced and good men were hard to find. When the occupation was planned in 1945, 60 divisions were available from which to draw its forces, by 1946 the number fell to 12.²⁸ This resulted in a 100 percent turnover rate in the U.S. Constabulary in both 1946 and 1947.²⁹

MG Harmon knew he had to address the discipline issue and could see that manning was going to be a challenge; therefore, he drafted policies which would set high expectations for the troopers. First, MG Harmon personally designed the uniform and unit patch that would ensure his troopers were instantly identifiable as distinct from the rest of the Army.³⁰ The unit patch had a large blue Circle with a blue C in the center, set on a yellow background, and with a red

lightning bolt running through it. The patch combined the colors of the infantry, cavalry and artillery respectively, to represent the primary branches of service from which the Constabulary was formed. The symbol was affixed to helmets (Appendix B), vehicles, uniforms, and buildings in order to make certain the troopers were conspicuous. The purpose of the distinct markings was to separate the constabulary from the rabble rousing hoi polloi of the Army and to foster within the unit a sense of being elite; thus, the constabulary was built as a self policing and self disciplining organization that was trusted by the Army and locals alike. Furthermore, by being viewed as elite, higher quality individuals self-identified and volunteered for the Cowboys. MG Harmon took further steps to build his force on a foundation of discipline.

In addition to ensuring his troopers were easily identifiable, MG Harmon also handpicked the initial cadre, whose mission was to train the follow-on classes of troopers and train indigenous police. The initial class of 532 officers and enlisted members were chosen due to their exemplary records and they met grueling standards. MG Harmon required the following of all his troopers:

Physically, he had to be at least 5'7" tall, weigh over 140 pounds, have good vision without glasses, and be 'strong, erect, well-proportioned, hard, tough, enduring, with quick reactions.' Mentally he was to be officer-grade material—to have scored in classes I or II of the Army General Classification Test—and to be 'alert, observant, and tactful.' He was further to be of excellent moral character, 'honest, loyal, cooperative, conscientious, adaptable.'³¹

This initial cadre met those standards and as the first troopers trained, they would set the standard for the thousands of troopers who followed behind them.

In order to provide the best possible training, MG Harmon selected Colonel Henry C. Newton as commandant and director of training. Colonel (COL) Newton was appointed on 18 February and had two weeks to prepare for the first class's arrival. COL Newton had served at the Armored Force Training Center in Fort Knox, Kentucky and had a reputation as a brilliant

and tough administrator.³² COL Newton recognized two critical areas and focused the curriculum around them. First, he wanted to reinforce the aura of the U.S. Constabulary as an elite force and second, he recognized that none of the trainees were police and would therefore have to be trained in skills not common to soldiering.

From the onset of training, the U.S. Constabulary's status as an elite force was evident. MG Harmon chose as the location for the Constabulary School, a former school for high level Nazi leaders in Sonthoven, near the Austrian border. The secluded mountain environment, relatively untouched by allied bombing, was home to a remarkable building wrought in stone and wood. The building had classrooms, dormitories, two gymnasiums, a parade ground and a dining hall capable of seating 1,500 students at a sitting.³³ So impressive were the facilities that one student commented that "our quarters were better than most college dorms I had seen at Yale University."³⁴ COL Newton ensured that earning the trappings of elite status was a priority and discipline was expected and maintained at all times.

For example, though students were treated to classical music performed by local musicians during meals served on porcelain dishes, the Senior Noncommissioned Officer at each table was appointed table commandant responsible for enforcing manners, appropriate conversation and general conduct. At the end of the meal, the table commandant remained at his table where he was inspected by members of the staff. Failure could result in revoking table commanders' privileges or disciplinary action.³⁵ Throughout the course of their education as troopers, soldiers were reminded that they were expected to uphold standards of personal appearance, courtesy, cleanliness, care of equipment and attention to detail. The product was a highly disciplined trooper. However, discipline was not the only purpose of the school; the coursework was equally rigorous.

Early training consisted of unit-level on-the-job training. Lessons learned by the troopers while on patrol were quickly turned into lesson plans and the training was relatively ad hoc. However, the establishment of the Constabulary School guaranteed a sound curriculum was developed and consistently administered. Coursework at the school included: geopolitics, to include German history; police subjects such as elements of crime and investigation; tactics and weapons; motors, in order to be self-reliant with often overused vehicles with few replacement parts; communications, both technical communications such as radio training and interpersonal communications such as how to interact with local politicians; general subjects such as border control methods; and finally, leadership, discipline and training methods.³⁶ Finally, troopers were trained to act as a liaison between occupying combat forces and local *burgermeisters* (mayors) and additionally, were responsible for training local police; therefore, troopers were encouraged to learn local language and customs. Given the quality of the troopers and the level of education they received, it is not surprising that the U.S. Constabulary was a success.

Though the guerrilla warfare, insurgency, and neo-Nazism the U.S. Constabulary was initially formed to counter never materialized, the constabulary nonetheless provided an important function. For two years, the U.S. Constabulary was the only operational police force in war-torn Germany. From July 1946 to April 1947, 14,157 troopers participated in 77 operations which led to 1,500 arrests.³⁷ At its height in November and December of 1946, 18 operations were performed by over 6,000 troopers.³⁸ Additionally, troopers logged some 80,000 patrols by horse-mounted platoons, foot soldiers, motorcycles and other vehicles "resulting in a dramatic decrease in black market operations, smuggling, and traffic accidents."³⁹ This outstanding ability to perform police duties and provide security earned the respect of the German people. The Germans referred to the troopers as *Blitzpolizei*, or the Lightning Police, for the impression that

they were everywhere at all times, thus living up to their motto of “Mobility, Vigilance, Justice.”⁴⁰ Kendall Gott summarizes constabulary operations in post-war Germany as,

An ever present, professional force, the troopers of the Circle C enforced the law and bridged the gap between the occupiers and the vanquished until Germany could maintain law and order for itself. The U.S. Constabulary existed as an organization for only six years, but it was a story of success. It had accomplished the mission of ensuring the successful American occupation of Germany and the lasting peace that followed.⁴¹

It was not happenstance that the Circle C Cowboys were effective. One enduring lesson underscores their success: proper training can overcome limitations in resources, assuage a high turnover rate, and produce effective, elite soldiers who take pride in their work and are geared toward mission success. Understanding that the elite Circle C Cowboys played an important role in Stability Operations in Germany, it is useful to review how Stability Operations are conducted in the campaign in Afghanistan to evaluate whether enduring lessons can be applied.

One of the principal aims of the U.S. Government is security and prosperity in Afghanistan.⁴² In support of that aim, the National Defense Strategy recognizes that the effort in Afghanistan requires a unified Stability Operations approach. This is because “military success alone is insufficient to achieve victory.”⁴³ Additionally, the essential components of long-term success in Afghanistan include security, the rule of law, good governance, and training and equipping indigenous military and police forces.⁴⁴ Though the approach must be a whole of government effort, the burden of conducting Stability Operations falls squarely on the shoulders of the Department of Defense. As Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (Stability Operations) dated September 16, 2009, directs, proficiency in Stability Operations is considered equally important as proficiency in Combat Operations and the Department of Defense will lead and support Stability Operations efforts throughout the spectrum of conflict if civilian agencies more suited to the rule of law and stability cannot or will not lead.⁴⁵ The effect of this is that,

given the lion's share of resources, DoD has essentially taken the lead. The way in which this has manifested itself is a unified approach to Stability Operations conducted via Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

US-PRTs are interim civil-military organizations designed to operate in an area with unstable or limited security.⁴⁶ The combined military and civil efforts are required to reduce conflict while developing the local institutions to take the lead in their own governance, the supply of basic services, economic development, and enforcement of rule of law.⁴⁷ US-PRTs were first established in Afghanistan in 2002, and today there are 25 US-PRTs, 12 of which are American (Appendix C).⁴⁸ US-PRTs usually consist of approximately 80 to 100 personnel. For example, in the case of US-PRT Farah, there are 97 military personnel and 3 civilians posted to the US-PRT.⁴⁹ The military element performs several functions.

The military element of a US-PRT consists of a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC), Civil Affairs Teams, Tactical Trainers, and a Force Protection element.⁵⁰ The CMOC is charged with coordinating local Afghan requests and matching them with US-PRT capacity to ensure the welfare of the province in which the US-PRT is located. The Civil Affairs Teams, usually consisting of six personnel, follow up on the villagers' requests, seek opportunities for projects, and prioritize projects.⁵¹ The Tactical Trainers interact with the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA) providing training and support while the Force Protection Element exists to ensure the security of the US-PRT and all the efforts contained therein.⁵² Additionally serving the US-PRT is a Headquarters element which provides support functions such as translators, medical personnel, engineers, intelligence, Military Police, and service support.⁵³ Though multi-functional, a majority of the military personnel are dedicated to Force Protection, which is where the weight of effort lies within the US-PRT. As highlighted in

a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) report regarding US-PRT effectiveness, “force protection is referred to as ‘the blood which courses through the US-PRT.’” More than half of the US-PRT personnel are involved with this mission in accordance with the U.S. guideline that defines security as paramount to the mission.⁵⁴ US-PRTs are not combat units, but they are often co-located with combat units which they can call if threatened by an insurgent attack. Though the security mission is vital, it is not the sole reason for the existence of PRTs.

The civilian personnel assigned to US-PRTs generally number between three and five and include one person each from the Department of State (DoS), USAID, and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) or other U.S. Government (USG) representatives.⁵⁵ Additionally, a representative from the Afghan Interior Ministry is often assigned to a US-PRT as well. These government representatives work together to achieve their strategic goals. These goals include,

Establishing and strengthening relationships with provincial and local political, religious and business leaders, especially moderates; Providing training and advice in order to improve capacity to govern; Engaging in small- to moderate-scale reconstruction and development projects; Improving security for local populations by coordinating local security structures; and Supporting local business development initiatives in pursuit of improving local economies.⁵⁶

The goals are numerous and require a joint civil-military approach if they are to be reached.

Though it is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of US-PRTs, and to date there has been no concerted government effort to do so, a basic understanding of US-PRT organization and mission provides the foundation for a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis which will reveal whether lessons of the U.S. Constabulary may further aid in US-PRT mission effectiveness. A complete SWOT analysis (Appendix D) will not be discussed; rather,

the focus is on the top strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats discovered. In this manner, recommendations will be provided following the analysis.

The very nature of US-PRTs, the civil-military approach, is its defining strength. In 2006, a study conducted by USAID aimed at evaluating the interagency effectiveness of US-PRTs determined that US-PRTs “have been an effective tool for stabilization in Afghanistan, strengthening provincial and district-level institutions and empowering local leaders who support the central government. In many locations, US-PRTs have helped create conditions that make increased political, social, and economic development possible”.⁵⁷ This is attributed, in part, to US-PRTs having the flexibility to conduct operations in their Area of Responsibility (AOR) which the civil-military team deemed would have the maximum positive impact.⁵⁸ The report also makes clear that USG involvement, versus a military-only approach, is a key enabler for positive impact. To further accomplish the aims of the US-PRTs, the civil-military teams have a variety of tools at their disposal. One of the most useful is the Quick Impact Project (QIP).

QIPs implemented by US-PRTs are usually short-term, small-scale “hearts and minds” initiatives that are designed to have an immediate impact contributing to post-conflict stabilization or recovery. QIPs can benefit the US-PRT mission by increasing force protection, intelligence gathering, acceptance of foreign troops, and, conversely, opposition to enemy forces.⁵⁹ Civil Affairs officers assigned to the US-PRTs work with the USG representatives to monitor QIPs’ progress, gauge the impact on the local population, and ensure the QIP is focused where it is most needed, providing the most favorable result. When properly executed, QIPs are an effective tool in building indigenous capacity. Providing the security necessary to ensure the QIPs take hold is, naturally, a part of the military’s role in the US-PRT.

Whereas the USG representatives' focus is primarily in implementing projects to positively influence the Afghan people, force security is the primary role of the military. By establishing a secure environment, USG representatives can more freely focus on efforts to build capacity for the Afghans. Though the effectiveness of the security provided will be called into question later in this work, it cannot be doubted that it is a critical task which, if not pursued, would clearly lead to mission failure.

Beyond providing security, the military provides additional expertise as Civil Affairs and Military Information Support to Operations (MISO) experts. These experts are critical to enhancing the effectiveness of US-PRTs. They do so by supporting the USG strategic communications campaign, providing funds via QIPs, and as Army Field Manual 3-07 (Stability Operations) states, "by enhancing the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present."⁶⁰

Finally, by simply maintaining a presence, the military allows US-PRTs to provide a stronghold in outlying provinces. This allows the USG representatives to have access to isolated portions of the population and further serves as an outpost for ANA and ANP personnel who are provided shelter, equipment and training by US-PRT members.⁶¹ Though the military provides security and aid to the ANP, the scope and effectiveness of those efforts lie at the heart of the US-PRT's weakness.

One of the US-PRTs' greatest weaknesses is their inability to perform police functions. FM 3-07 specifically directs that certain critical tasks be performed as part of Stability Operations. Among those tasks are "perform[ing] civilian police functions, including investigating crimes and making arrests" and to "locate and safeguard key witnesses, documents, and other evidence related to key ongoing or potential investigations and prosecutions."⁶² FM 3-

07 goes on to document that the tasks represent “actions that must occur during and after direct armed conflict to ensure the long-term sustainability of any reform efforts.”⁶³

The inability to meet the requirements of FM 3-07 and the reliance on the ANP exclusively to accomplish those tasks have contributed to a weak security environment. US-PRTs provide security only for USG members when they leave the camp and for the camp itself. They are not charged with patrolling. According to a report to Congress from the Department of Defense in November 2010, the environment of the AOR surrounding the US-PRTs is often tenuous and needs considerable improvement.⁶⁴ However, US-PRTs are not intended to directly implement major security sector activities because “they lack the size and military assets to disarm local militias or play a direct role in the disarming militia groups. Their primary tools for enhancing security are dialogue and liaison.”⁶⁵ However, US-PRTs are not maximizing their dialogue and liaison efforts and are further undermining their effectiveness.

Though not specifically mentioned by FM 3-07, an additional benefit of performing the policing tasks prescribed provide an opportunity for dialogue with the local populous. A failure to accomplish the tasks, with the benefits of dialogue, is tantamount to undermining the security situation. To expand on the importance of engaging with the populous, in a 2009 speech to the Canadian Embassy, Afghan Political Counselor M. Ashraf Haidari noted that for US-PRTs to be successful, they must

engage in greater communication with the Afghan people, through regular discussions with the elderly, local government officials, the clergy and ordinary Afghans. Increased communication will result in greater knowledge and information about each other. Your troops will learn more about the Afghan people, and the Afghan people will learn more about your troops and your countries. Greater communication will help manage expectations and result in greater mutual respect and understanding, and greater level of confidence and trust. Moreover, open and candid discussion will give the US-PRTs an opportunity to learn how their performance is assessed and perceived by the true beneficiaries of their efforts—the people of Afghanistan.⁶⁶

US-PRT military personnel, locked in a martial rather than policing mindset, are less likely to be receptive to engaging with the local populous. Conversely, combat patrols performed in full “battle rattle” do not lend themselves to the type of interaction called for by the Counselor. By definition, combat patrols are not perceived as approachable. The combined challenge of changing the mindset of the US-PRT military personnel as well as Afghani perception is a roadblock which hampers the dialogue necessary to increase security.

In addition to failing to provide adequate security, the lack of a policing capacity in the US-PRTs limits opportunities for intelligence gathering. In order to gather meaningful intelligence, traditional signals intelligence collection methods are not sufficient. Interaction with the people to build trust and ultimately, to gather information, is a key task. According to Army Field Manual 3-24 (Counterinsurgency), “Intelligence in COIN [counterinsurgency] is about people. U.S. forces must understand the people of the host nation, the insurgents, and the host-nation (HN) government.”⁶⁷ Additionally, effective intelligence is essential to understanding the environment and making plans; this is especially true in Stability Operations, when intelligence efforts hinge on the support of local populace.⁶⁸ Without a frequent, non-threatening presence amongst the population, US-PRTs have restricted opportunities for intelligence gathering.

Finally, not having resident police skills impacts the US-PRT military forces’ ability to train the ANP. Though the Bonn Agreement of 2001 specifically assigned the lead for police training to Germany, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 curtails Department of Defense’s (DoD) role in police training, the reality on the ground in Afghanistan is that Americans are providing training to the ANP. In August of 2010, the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations

Institute published a study entitled "U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap." That study recognized that the U.S. military trains the ANP, but not in policing. It states that the U.S. military tends to focus its training on tasks with which it is familiar, such as weapons training and combat patrolling rather than community-based policing.⁶⁹ Since community-based policing is at the core of a stable society governed by the rule of law and that the goal for Afghanistan is self-governance, if called upon to provide enhanced training, the US-PRT will miss the mark. This is punctuated by a 2008 RAND study which rated several key counterinsurgency capabilities, including policing; in it, RAND rated the ability of the DoD to prepare and enable police operations as "deficient."⁷⁰ Overall, the lack of resident police skills within the US-PRTs impacts their ability to provide security, conduct intelligence gathering and provide much needed training. Clearly, DoD must address this weakness.

The SWOT analysis reveals that the greatest opportunity for US-PRTs is the fact that they are widely accepted as both the most effective short-term solution and as the most likely model for future Stability Operations. One indicator that US-PRTs are here to stay is that the Army has made the investment in providing guidance for their operation. Specifically, FM 3-07 devotes an entire Appendix to detailing the mission, goals, organization and structure of US-PRTs.⁷¹ The inclusion of PRTs into Army doctrine is evidence of the confidence in which the Army believes it will employ PRTs in the future. The DoD at large shares this confidence. In a November 2010 DoD report to Congress entitled "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan," the DoD hailed the efforts of several regional US-PRTs as successes in the realms of building security and freedom of movement and offered no alternative to the US-PRT construct.⁷² Joseph Collins, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War

College, echoes the support. He posits, "ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] and the US-PRTs have generally been successful. They have won over the Afghan government, the United Nations mission, and many of the local people in the areas where they operate."⁷³ Given the backing of the Army, the DoD, and formal military learning institutions, it is clear that US-PRTs are here to stay. As such, US-PRTs are worthy of investment geared at improving their effectiveness. Unfortunately, there are not unlimited resources to make improvements.

A lack of proper resourcing is the most serious threat facing US-PRTs. Regarding the budgeting and resourcing for the campaign in Afghanistan, House Armed Services Committee Chairman, Representative Ike Skelton in a letter to President Obama in September of 2009 stated, "I am convinced that there is no strategy short of a properly-resourced counter-insurgency campaign that is likely to provide lasting security."⁷⁴ He went on to say that undertaking a counter-insurgency campaign is complex, and it will require additional resources, both civilian and military and finally that the effort will take time.⁷⁵ Almost a year later, with some of those resources provided as part of the surge, General David Petraeus, while commanding United States Central Command, noted in official testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee that, "Tripling the U.S. force contribution and increasing similarly the U.S. civilian component, have enabled the initiation of comprehensive civil-military counterinsurgency operations in key districts in Afghanistan."⁷⁶ These remarks show just how important proper resourcing is; conversely, war-weary Americans are ready to withdraw from Afghanistan and future funding is sure to be scarce. Therefore, any recommendations for improving effectiveness must be cost effective as well as high impact.

The Greek warrior and poet, Archilochus, is often credited with saying, "We do not rise to the level of our expectations. We fall to the level of our training." Whether the quote is indeed

attributable to him, that the axiom endures strikes a chord with us today, and speaks of the overriding importance of training. Given the history of the Circle C Cowboys, their focus on training, and their level of success, the principal lesson we can apply to US-PRTs today is that through specialized constabulary-style training, US-PRTs can increase their effectiveness as an instrument of U.S. policy. Before outlining which tasks should be trained, it is important to first identify who will be trained.

Following the lead of the U.S. Constabulary, personnel of the highest possible caliber should receive training. However, unlike the Circle C Cowboys, these personnel are not to be members of a dedicated constabulary. As indicated at the outset, this paper will not take sides on the debate regarding whether a separate constabulary should be formed. It is the assumption that the debate will go on without resolution for the immediate future. Instead, having identified through the SWOT analysis the viable strengths of US-PRTs, it is necessary to capitalize on the opportunities US-PRTs offer as an effective and widely accepted model for Stability Operations. Therefore, the proposed construct is to train military US-PRT members in constabulary-type policing duties as an additional duty.

Members assigned such duties will provide their Force Protection mission first. Policing missions will be initiated only at the request of ANP, in coordination with and approval from US-PRT leadership. To maximize the effectiveness of this construct, volunteers should be identified first, and then personnel of exceptional experience and dedication should be recruited. Based on the patrolling model of the Circle C Cowboys, which was typically 10-13 troopers with a Senior Noncommissioned Officer in charge, each US-PRT should have roughly the same number of personnel trained.⁷⁷ However, as the ANP has primary responsibility for policing and

the US-PRT members will augment them, the total training does not have to be as rigorous as that of the Cowboys.

At its height, the Circle C Cowboys had a thorough five-week training plan providing 176 hours of training (Appendix E).⁷⁸ As previously mentioned, troopers were instructed in various police subjects, tactics, leadership and a host of other skills. The reason the training was so intensive was threefold: First, though every effort was made to select only the best and most experienced personnel, some of the troopers entering the unit came directly from basic training as conscripts. Second, this was an entirely new mission, and there was no doctrine from which to draw. Thus, it was necessary to cast a wide net and teach varying subjects. Finally, at the initiation of the U.S. Constabulary there was no existing German police force. Therefore, troopers would be responsible for all of the security and policing in their assigned areas.

The inclusion of newly minted soldiers drove intense basic skills training. New soldiers had only a very rudimentary understanding of soldiering skills, including tactics and weapons. Therefore, one of the greatest concentrations of instruction was in tactics and weapons (43 hours) and general subjects (32 hours).⁷⁹ For example, the tactics and weapons training included Squad and Platoon tactics, designed to familiarize troopers and their leaders with each other and their mission. In addition to basic skills, the realities of creating a new unit with a new mission drove the need for specialized training. Though tactics and weapons training included police-type tasks such as guard and care of prisoners, police subjects (12 hours) and geopolitics (23 hours) represented a substantial training investment. These subjects covered topics such as police procedures, laws of arrest, giving evidence, courts and laws, and German history.⁷⁹ Finally, Circle C curriculum included special courses in addition to the training previously mentioned. These courses included a Special Investigations Course, an Intelligence Course, and

a one-week Field Grade Officers Orientation Course. This training was appropriate for the mission and soldier of World War II. What follows is a proposal for a condensed version of training for US-PRT members. From the five-week, 176-hour course, the course should be condensed to 99 hours (Appendix E). Assuming an eight-hour day of instruction and a six-day instruction week, the curriculum will be complete in just over two weeks versus the five week program of the Circle C Cowboys. Naturally, all lessons will be updated to reflect current doctrine, policy, tactics, technology and cultural customs.

First, 20 of the 43 hours dedicated to the Tactics and Weapons course can be eliminated. The Tables of Organization and Combined Demonstrations lessons are not required for soldiers simply augmenting the ANP. The remaining training from this course should focus on ANP tactics with time dedicated to practicing those tactics in concert with ANP personnel. Also, to ensure rule of law, the rights of the suspected insurgents and criminals must be understood. Therefore, the Guard and Care of Prisoners lesson should be updated with current policy.

Next, the Police Subjects course should include the same lessons as the Cowboys, but must include the Courts and Laws lesson from the Geopolitics course. This follows a more logical construct. More importantly, it reinforces rule of law, one of the end states toward which efforts must be directed and important for long-term recovery.⁸⁰ The remainder of the Geopolitics course will remain essentially the same, substituting Afghan Culture and History for German history. Additionally, the Motors and Communications are relics of a time when troopers were expected to fix their run-down equipment while working in remote areas. The support available today is more robust and the equipment is generally more reliable. Consequently, those ten hours of instruction can be deleted. Also, there is no detailed description readily available for the Leadership, Discipline, and Training Methods course and as

a result, one can only surmise what the lessons may have included. However, these are valuable areas for instruction, especially given the number of unique challenges facing those who accept the additional duty; consequently, training should include at least eight hours of instruction in this block.

Finally, the General Subjects course should be generally re-vamped and limited to skills unique to policing and relevant for US-PRT members. Map reading is taught at basic training, again at advanced individual training, and is largely moot due to the prevalence of Global Positioning System information. As such, it can be removed from the curriculum. Next, the report writing portion of the curriculum can be eliminated because US-PRT members should not author the official reports. The ANP must be held responsible for writing the official reports in order to bolster the legitimacy of their policing actions and enable their independent action. Though this skill is unique to policing, it is not relevant for US-PRT members; therefore, information gathered by US-PRT members should be passed using existing mechanisms such as the daily situational report (commonly referred to as the SITREP). Next, because the soldiers selected for this duty will come from the combat arms branches and will have received the training previously, it is reasonable to eliminate Unarmed Self-Defense. However, it is necessary to instruct cultural expectations regarding physical contact between local nationals and US-PRT members. Consequently, this should be included in the Afghan Culture lesson and is not applicable here. Finally, because of the proposed interaction with the ANP, the Structure and Mission of Afghan Forces and the Role of the PRT lessons will be fundamental to success. Based on the recommendations for who should be trained and what they should be trained, numerous opportunities for further research are evident.

The need for additional training is clear; thus, further scrutiny must be given to the curriculum. This paper provides a thumbnail sketch intended as a first step. Full analysis of the critical tasks presented in the curriculum would provide greater clarity for those who agree with the conclusions of this paper and who want to make it a reality. Additionally, for the andragogically minded, research regarding the level of Bloom's Taxonomy in which each task should be instructed is required to set the foundation for lesson plan development. For example, based on US-PRT members working in tandem with the ANP and not on their own like the Circle C cowboys, should students be trained at Bloom's highest levels of taxonomy (synthesis and evaluation)? Or, is it enough that the training provides a less stringent, knowledge-level, foundation?

Additional opportunities for further research surround the questions of who should be trained, how they are retained, and the impact of dual-qualified personnel on the existing mission. As evidenced by MG Harmon, picking someone who "gets it" is essential to stability operations. Therefore, methods of identifying and recruiting personnel who are willing and able to perform constabulary operations need to be addressed. Additionally, those who demonstrate Clausewitzian "genius" in stability operations should move up the chain just as readily as those who show genius in major combat operations (or the "full spectrum" as the case may be). Next, once identified and recruited, those personnel performing constabulary operations must be retained. Consequently, further studies must explore the usefulness of incentivizing those who assume constabulary operations while additionally exploring the possibility of making constabulary duties a viable career path. Finally, if the recommendations herein are accepted, commanders are sure to question how they will operate with 10 percent of their Force Protection providers busy with an additional duty. Greater detail regarding estimated hours spent on patrol

each week may assuage or compound commanders' concerns depending on the results of the research. As proved, it is in the interest of those dedicated to enhancing the US-PRT mission to provide police training. Further research will help elucidate the validity of that conclusion. Though further research is warranted, the implications of adopting the approach proposed are far-reaching and worth considering.

The benefits of employing constabulary type skills in a stability operations environment are extensive. Most importantly, as mentioned earlier, policing is an essential task for stability operations. In a stability operations environment, policing is required to establish public order and safety which, as FM 3-07 reiterates, represents "actions that must occur during and after direct armed conflict to ensure the long-term sustainability of any reform efforts."⁸¹ Although the successful execution of the mission is of utmost importance and is the greatest justification for pursuing constabulary training, there are parochial benefits worth mentioning as well.

One of the reasons the Circle C was successful in their mission was that they moved openly amid the German populous. They accepted risk by not barricading themselves in remote outposts; furthermore, they did not sequester themselves behind armored vehicles, body armor, and superior firepower. It was their training and tactics that fostered in the troopers the confidence necessary to move freely amongst the people. This benefit is directly translatable to today. Though US-PRTs are principally concerned with security, accepting more risk by moving throughout the populous without the encumbrances of "battle rattle" is equally important to mission success. Constabulary training can again provide the foundation for accepting and minimizing that risk while further enhancing US-PRTs' effectiveness. Moreover, raising the level of confidence of US-PRT members by training them in constabulary operations bears fruit

beyond the terms of deployment. A more confident soldier is a more effective soldier, regardless of mission or location.

Besides supporting justice and reconciliation, long-term recovery, and increasing confidence, there is one additional benefit of providing constabulary training: continuity. Continuity is required for several reasons. Just as the Circle C suffered a high turnover rate due to de-mobilization, today's all volunteer force is equally susceptible to turnover due to rotation cycles. The impact is that lessons must be re-learned as experienced soldiers leave and new ones take their place. Also, returning soldiers often find that the operational environment has changed and lessons learned during previous deployments are no longer applicable. Further complicating the issue is that, like all complex tasks, it takes time to become proficient in stability operations. Deployment cycles usually end just as proficiency reaches its zenith. New units take over and learning begins anew. Therefore, continuity can serve as a force multiplier by making operations more efficient.

Continuity is fostered through the relationships forged with the local populous and ANP. Whereas US-PRT members are in flux over time, the ANP and locals remain. The training provided for constabulary operations gains US-PRTs greater interaction with the ANP and locals through combined training; furthermore, it fosters trust and respect through shared risk. This builds bonds over time which can transcend individuals to become institutional memory. If properly executed, US-PRTs and the ANP can become closer, share lessons more easily, overcome cultural differences and lessen the impact of constant turnover and changing operations environment.


Implementing the recommendations contained herein is vital to increasing the positive impact of US-PRTs. Not only will implementation hone stability operations effectiveness, but

ancillary benefits such as increased confidence, will profit soldiers beyond the battlefield. The relatively small investment in training and manpower will result in a more effective force, and in turn greater mission success. For all of the reasons discussed, US-PRTs should take advantage of the lessons learned from the Circle C and implement the training which proved to be an effective stability operations tool.


Appendix A

U.S. Constabulary Organization

U.S. Constabulary Brigade




U.S. Constabulary Squadron



Appendix B


U.S. Constabulary "Circle C" Insignia



<http://www.U.S.militariaforum.com/forums/index.php?s=68ddb21b8227e69ca4f54c1d4ff8137a&showtopic=4240&st=0&p=25955&#entry25955>

Appendix C

Location of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan



<http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/maps/index.html>

Appendix D

SWOT Analysis of US-PRTs in Afghanistan

Internal	Strength: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Civil-Military Cooperation• Networked communication• Resident Firepower	Weakness: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Lack of Police Skills• Interagency cultural differences• Deployment rotations do not match between military and civilians
External	Opportunity: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• General Acceptance of US-PRT construct• Multitude of Studies and Lessons Learned	Threat: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Lack of resourcing• Timetables undermine long war approach

Appendix E

Training Syllabi Comparison

U.S. Constabulary

Course	Lessons
Tactics and Weapons (43 Hours)	Tables of Organization, Squad and Platoon Tactics, Guard and Care of Prisoners, Combined Demonstrations
Police Subjects (12 Hours)	Police Procedure, Laws of Arrest, Giving Evidence, Scene of the Crime
Communications (8 Hours)	Orientation, Maintenance, Nets, Security, Voice Procedure, Message Center Operations
Motors (2 Hours)	Care and Maintenance of Vehicles
Leadership, Discipline, and Training Methods (16 Hours)	No data available
Geopolitics (23 Hours)	German History, German Psychology, Courts and Laws
General Subjects (32 Hours)	Unarmed Self-Defense, Mad Reading, Written Reports, Geography of Germany
176 Hours Total	

Proposed US-PRT

Course	Lessons
Tactics and Weapons (20 Hours)	Squad and Platoon Tactics (Patrolling), Guard and Care of Prisoners
Police Subjects (16 Hours)	Police Procedure, Laws of Arrest, Giving Evidence, Scene of the Crime, Courts and Laws
Communications (8 Hours)	Orientation, Maintenance, Nets, Security, Voice Procedure, Message Center Operations
Motors (2 Hours)	Care and Maintenance of Vehicles
Leadership, Discipline, and Training Methods (8 Hours)	No data available
Geopolitics (23 Hours)	Afghan History, Afghan Culture
General Subjects (32 Hours)	Structure and Mission of Afghan Forces (ANP, ANA, ANSF), Role of PRT
99 Hours Total	

Notes

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4. French National Gendarmerie, Official Website, <http://www.gendarmerie.interieur.gouv.fr/eng>
5. European Gendarmerie Force, Official Website, <http://www.eurogendfor.org/>
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8. Ibid., 38.
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11. Craig T. Trebilcock, "The Myth of Posse Comitatus", *Journal of Homeland Security Online*, (2000), <http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/trebilcock.htm>, (accessed November 2, 2010).
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18. Ibid., 35.
19. Kendall D. Gott, *Mobility, Vigilance, and Justice: The US Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1953*; Occasional Paper 11, *Global War on Terrorism Series*. (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 3.
20. Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946* (Washington: Center of Military History, 1990)
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21. John Capone. *Forgotten Peacekeepers, The Story of the United States Constabulary in Germany*. (Montana: Stand Up America, 2009), 21.
22. Kendall D. Gott, *Mobility, Vigilance, and Justice: The US Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1953*; Occasional Paper 11, *Global War on Terrorism Series*. (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 45.
23. Ibid., 6.
24. Ibid., 11. It is important to note that this particular organizational style is not unlike the Army's current Maneuver Enhancement (ME) Brigade in both function and organization. Optimized for distributed operations, the ME looks very similar to the Circle C. For more information refer to Army Field Manual 3-90.31. A good summary can be found at:
<http://www.wood.Army.mil/engrmag/Maneuver%20Support%20Magazine/PDFs%20for%20Winter%202009/Williams-Crider.pdf>
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